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Telling the Complex Story of Unionism
As the Union army surged into Tennessee in the late winter and early spring
of 1862, it gained control over a staging area for operations to the south and east.
But it also became an occupying force in a state where internal conflict
simmered. Most Tennessee whites were pro-Confederate, but some were not.
Throughout the state, pockets of Unionism persisted. In East Tennessee,
Unionists outnumbered Confederates.
President Abraham Lincoln promptly appointed Andrew Johnson, until
recently a U.S. Senator, to head a military government for the state. Under its
auspices, fourteen Union cavalry regiments ultimately were raised. Many
blue-coated volunteers—dubbed “Tories" or “homegrown Yankees" by spiteful
Confederates—came from East Tennessee. Others came from embattled
pro-Union communities in Middle and West Tennessee. The Cumberland
Plateau of Middle Tennessee and a region of West Tennessee adjoining the
Tennessee River included significant numbers of loyalists. Most pro-Union
localities held fewer slaves than the statewide average and had a tradition of
Whig politics. Bedford County, located in the prosperous Middle Tennessee
basin, was an interesting partial outlier (it did have Whig majorities).
Tennessee’s Union volunteers enlisted to protect their home communities.
Federal advances in early 1862 liberated many pro-Union strongholds in Middle
and West Tennessee. After an unhappy year of occupation, Middle and West
Tennessee loyalists were intent upon stopping pro-Confederate depredations and
re-establishing security for their families and kinfolk. East Tennessee volunteers
itched to rescue their home region, which remained behind Confederate lines
until late 1863.
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But Union commanders planning campaigns into Mississippi and Georgia
cared little about protecting loyalists. William T. Sherman saw no reason to
chase guerrillas who were “chiefly engaged in harassing their own people" (179).
Sherman expected Tennessee cavalry to participate directly in support of Union
army offensives. He also wanted the Tennessee cavalry to flush out Nathan
Bedford Forrest, Joseph Wheeler, and John Hunt Morgan, rebel cavalry
commanders who disrupted the Union army’s increasingly long and vulnerable
rail supply lines and telegraphic communications.
James Alex Baggett’s Homegrown Yankees: Tennessee’s Union Cavalry in
the Civil War expertly surveys the history of Tennessee’s Union cavalry. Seven
regiments were raised in 1862 and early 1863, four from East Tennessee and
three from the middle and western parts of the state. The most formidable was
the First Tennessee Cavalry, composed of East Tennessee refugees and
successively commanded by Robert Johnson and James B. Brownlow, sons
respectively of Governor Johnson and Knoxville newspaper editor William G.
“Parson" Brownlow. William B. Stokes, a long-time Whig and former
congressman from DeKalb County in Middle Tennessee’s Cumberland uplands,
led the Fifth Tennessee Cavalry. The units first organized in West Tennessee
were the Sixth, commanded by Fielding Hurst of McNairy County, and the
Seventh, led by Judge Isaac R. Hawkins of Carroll County. The fourteen
regiments of Tennessee Cavalry, which consisted of three-year volunteers, were
joined by eight additional regiments of mounted infantry, who enlisted for one
year in late 1863—four from Middle Tennessee and four from East Tennessee.
Initially hopeful that an armed Union presence might pacify the state,
Governor Johnson and his cavalry soon confronted the ugly reality of
pro-Confederate guerrillas, coupled with daring raids by Forrest, Wheeler, and
Morgan—all actively or passively supported by white civilians. Union cavalry
thereupon began to expel leading rebels and to confiscate their crops and
animals. A violent spiral of tit-for-tat retribution intensified. Civil institutions
and agricultural output collapsed, as has been memorably recounted in Steven V.
Ash’s book, Middle Tennessee Society Transformed, 1860-1870: War and Peace
in the Upper South (1988).
Patriotic Confederates have always denigrated the Tennessee Union
Cavalry—they were traitors and Tories, they committed atrocities, they
welcomed slave rebels as allies, and they were inept amateurs who never could
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stand up against Forrest, Wheeler, and Morgan. Baggett suggests a more
complex story. Loyal volunteers most wanted to protect their kinfolk and home
communities from the scourge of war. They hoped that Confederates would see
the writing on the wall and abandon armed resistance. That did not happen, of
course, and both sides behaved inexcusably at times in the dirty war that
followed.
Ulysses S. Grant, George H. Thomas, and Sherman, the renowned generals
who led Union forces in the west, likewise tended to take a dim view of the
Tennessee Union Cavalry. Baggett reminds us, however, that top Union
commanders and the Tennessee volunteers had differing priorities. The Union
brass thought that cavalry existed either to support the advance of the main
armies or to defeat and capture Confederate raiders who threatened Union supply
lines and communications. But pro-Union Tennesseans had an intensely local
focus. Baggett contends that the Tennessee Union Cavalry, aided by mounted
infantry, ultimately liberated the state from Confederate guerrillas, whose
excesses forfeited civilian “support and sympathy" (164, 385). This tangible
accomplishment has long been overlooked. Baggett also shows that the
Tennessee Union Cavalry campaigned creditably with the main
armies—especially at Nashville. They did much to keep rail and telegraph lines
open, and they did bag Morgan.
Homegrown Yankees broadens the scope of Civil War military history. It
changes the focus from broad strategy and generalship to the complicated
realities of what was happening behind Union lines in the occupied South. The
focus on Tennessee is auspicious. Confederate allegiances there were not
universal, and Union support persisted in localities far from the Union-loving
heartland of East Tennessee. Because Middle and West Tennessee were the first
major parts of a seceding state—other than Northwestern Virginia—to fall into
Union hands, they may have contributed to a misleading mirage. Like Lincoln,
Grant initially hoped that sensible white Southerners soon would realize their
folly and abandon the Confederate cause. This is what he thought he saw
happening when many ordinary white Tennesseans flocked to his army to enlist.
Writing to his wife on March 18, 1862, Grant hailed “the strong manifestation of
Union feeling" that he had encountered (35-36). But three weeks later at Shiloh,
Grant discovered what he really was up against. Grant—if not yet
Lincoln—appears to have realized that most of the Confederacy was not
honeycombed with Middle and West Tennessee’s Unionist localities, and he
famously “gave up all idea of saving the Union except by complete conquest."
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Daniel W. Crofts, Professor of History at The College of New Jersey, is the
author of Reluctant Confederates: Upper South Unionists in the Secession Crisis
(University of North Carolina Press, 1989) and the forthcoming sequel, A
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